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FROM ODD ENCOUNTERS TO A PROSPECTIVE 
CONFLUENCE: DANCE-PHILOSOPHY 
BOJANA CVEJIĆ INDEPENDENT SCHOLAR 
This text could begin with an emphatic assertion: there has not yet been a philosophy of dance 
that compares to the theories brought forth by music, theatre, poetry or visual art throughout the 
Western history of philosophy and aesthetics since Plato. Several accounts of a vexed relationship 
between Western theatre-dance and philosophy repeat the same refrain: that (Western) 
philosophy ‘neglects dance’ (Sparshott 1983) and has had very little to say about dancing (Levin 
1983). Although baroque ballet has developed equally through both dancing practice and the 
discourse of the eighteenth century genre of the treatise (Cahusac [1754] 2004, Noverre [1760] 
2004), dance as such has been excluded from hierarchical classifications of the beaux arts, most 
notably from Diderot’s and D’Alembert’s Enyclopédie (1751–1782). Moreover, François Pouillaude 
has recently argued that the birth of modern aesthetics means, for dance, the installment of its 
literal, ‘inaugural absence’ (Pouillaude 2009, 15) from philosophical interest. While Kant’s Critique 
of Judgment (1790) makes only two brief remarks in passing about dance, perhaps because the 
combination of ‘the play of sensations in music with the play of figures in the dance’ (§ 52) shows 
a confusion of temporal and spatial (plastic) categories, Hegel’s Aesthetics ([1835/1842] 1975) and 
Schelling’s Philosophy of Art ([1802-03] 1989) make no mention of it. With the exception of the poetic 
privilege that Nietzsche confers upon it in Zarathustra’s dancing songs (Nietzsche, Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra [1891] 1974) — a conspicuous case of metaphorical abduction which, as we will discuss 
later, carries on into contemporary philosophy — we will have to wait until the second half of the 
twentieth century for dance to make its theoretical debut in a small number of serious attempts 
to investigate it philosophically (e.g., Langer 1953; Sheets-Johnstone 1966).  
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My interest here is not in rehearsing the arguments of a rationale for this significant omission of 
dance from the Western canons of philosophy, aesthetics and art theory. The list of reasons 
involves outdated, overly general, disputed or even humorously coarse speculations (that dance, 
for example, has always been a ‘female art’ [Sparshott 1983, 95]). Instead, I will draw out the distinct 
registers of encounters between dance and philosophy in a minor key that is ‘aside from’ or that 
critically transforms major concerns of Western modernity. The range of these encounters begins 
with a presentation of three characteristic themes or recurrent problems across both continental 
and analytic philosophical inquiries into the nature and status of dance as a specific art, inquiries 
which will expound the difficulty in the rapport between the practice of dance and the abstract 
reflection of thought. Exposing a variety of efforts in twentieth-century philosophy to provide 
essentialist definitions of dance will consequently lead us to a remarkable episode of 
contemporary French thought in which dance is wrested as an instrument to reinstate Alain 
Badiou’s and Jacques Rancière’s particular philosophical concerns—included here because of their 
considerable impact on contemporary dance practitioners. In a third step, I will observe an inverse 
movement: how late twentieth-century French theory prompted a reconceptualisation of 
choreography and performance which began in the mid 1990s in European dance (in the works of 
Jérôme Bel, Vera Mantero, Xavier Le Roy, Eszter Salamon, Mette Ingvartsen, and others). The 
implications of this paradigm shift from modern, formal abstract movement to what is 
inappropriately referred to as ‘conceptual dance’ provide the ground for another kind of thought 
that both stems from and gives rise to a distinctive set of current practices of making, performing 
and attending dance, and that could best be accounted for by the principle of expression in the 
philosophy of Gilles Deleuze. Lastly, I will conclude this preliminary outline of ‘dance-philosophy’ 
with the most recent philosophical encounters with dance, as well as with a few terms, specific to 
contemporary dance, which have yet to receive philosophical attention.    
Three problems for philosophies of dance:  
1. Dance as an art paradigm 
Dance’s belated acquisition of the status of an art discipline constitutes the first obstacle to 
philosophy’s consideration of dance as worthy of its theoretical interest. Jean-Georges Noverre’s 
plea for a reform of mid-eighteenth-century ballet as ‘ballet d’action’ after the Aristotelian 
dramaturgical model of mimesis during the Enlightenment proved to be a symptom of dance’s 
historical subservience to and theoretical entanglements with other arts; Noverre’s attempt to 
dignify dance on a par with tragedy was in vain, as his reform was ignored among theatre-dance 
practitioners during his lifetime and most of his experiments took place outside of France, the main 
center and object of his critique (Noverre 2004, xi). The subordination of dance to theatre drama 
and its inferior position vis-à-vis the other arts, due to its function of ornamental virtuosity, 
continued. It is only in the period of early modernism, and the second Industrial Revolution, from 
the latter half of the nineteenth century until the 1930s, that a rupture with ballet foregrounds 
bodily movements as both means and ends of modern dance as a new independent art. Dance 
history has favored the modernist ontology of dance in the vein of Clement Greenberg’s 
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theorisation of modernism associated with abstraction, where modern dance was hailed as a new 
‘beginning’, or as a ‘discovery of the actual substance of the dance, which it found to be movement’ 
(Martin [1933] 1989, 6), or as ‘absolute dance’ rooted in the pure bodily expression of subjective 
human experience, as Mary Wigman contends in her ‘philosophy of dance’ (Wigman in Cohen 1992, 
149–153). For dance to become ‘a paradigm of art’, in Rancière’s sense of ‘becoming a paradigm of 
the relation between […] the movements of a body on a stage and the gestures of a body in a 
workshop or in the street’ (Rancière 2014, n.p.), it also had to be recognized through ‘other eyes’, 
most notably in the writings of Stéphane Mallarmé, which will remain, as we shall see, the crucial 
reference for contemporary philosophy’s relation to dance (Badiou 1993; Rancière 2014; 
Pouillaude 2009). For Rancière, this ‘moment of dance’, in both the historical and conceptual sense 
—wherein one could also speak of a momentum by which a new balance between the body and 
movement is struck — also involves the emergence of a new subject position in which the first 
authors of modern dance appear. Or as Rancière summarises:    
… the conventional art of dramatic action and the ‘mechanical’ art of the ballet could 
be dismissed and substituted by a unique art of the performing body ‘speaking’ to 
the audience in the universal language of movement. (Rancière 2014, n.p.) 
Critical of the political consequences of claims of autonomy by virtue of the so-called universality 
of bodily movement, the post-Marxist literary theorist Andrew Hewitt regards modern dance as a 
source of an aesthetic ideology which proclaims emancipation through the body’s experience of 
its own truth as its nature. The purity of movement is staked out through its origin or source: the 
body of the dancer. Movement becomes ontologically bound to the body, ontologised as a minimal 
resting place of ‘noncompromisable subjectivity’ (Hewitt 2005, 18). Binding movement to the body 
as a mechanism of subjectivation will pose two problems: the core of dance’s holistic resistance to 
discursive thought coupled with dance practitioners’ mistrust of theorisation, and the difficulty in 
establishing the work of dance, which will be tackled next. 
2. The work of dance 
Thanks to the coincidence of the source, instrument and site of danced movement in the body, the 
work of dance is conferred special ontological status. In aesthetic theories from the 1980s and 
beyond, largely informed by phenomenology and analytic philosophy, the status presupposes a 
duality between the ‘work’ and its multiple instances, that is, ‘performances’ (see Davies 1991, 
Ingarden 1989).1 Graham McFee has formulated the most prominent view of analytic aesthetics on 
this issue: 
With dance, as with music, there are at least two ‘objects of appreciation’: the work 
itself and tonight’s performance of it. These might be treated differently for critical 
purposes: thus, the dance seen last night might have been a wonderful 
performance of a mediocre work or (more likely) the opposite. To provide a 
conceptual structure for discussion of such multiples, some writers (Wollheim 
1980, sections 35–6; McFee 1992, 90–4) have employed a type/token framework, 
such that dance performances are tokens of an (abstract) type. (McFee 2001, 546) 
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The uncertainty among analytic philosophers regarding what is constitutive and what is contingent 
for a work of dance viewed through a particular performance thereof cannot be the ground for 
attributing to it a purportedly weak, dubious, special or problematic condition. Such an ontological 
claim can be disputed, firstly, on the basis of its lack of specialist knowledge about dance practice, 
and secondly, its error of applying the standard of musical notation to dance. Moreover, the 
incapacity of Western philosophy and aesthetics to think dance might have to do with the tradition 
of applying to it the common regime of ‘the work of art’ (oeuvre), while there is ‘no library of 
movement’ and ‘no stable objects’ shareable by a broader community outside that of dance 
specialists (Pouillaude 2009, 9).  
Contesting the strict conditioning of Nelson Goodman’s division of allographic and autographic 
arts (Goodman 1976), Pouillaude has suggested that dance be considered an allographic art 
without notation. The allographic regime of dance grounds the possibility of iteration, extraction 
and retrieval of singular, constitutive characteristics – such as a repertory of movements, for 
instance – or contingent characteristics of an individual interpretation and their inscription in an 
oral-mimetic practice rather than in the writing and reading modes of music or literature. Most 
dance notation systems have proven insufficient or inadequate, lacking the prominence held by 
standardised Western notation in the world of music.2 Therefore, Pouillaude has reformulated the 
type-token duality in a framework more suited to dance: the work of dance exists at once as a 
‘public object’, shared and offered for judgment, and as a ‘resistant object’, capable of surviving the 
death of its initial protagonists, or in other words, existing beyond the experience or memory of its 
creation and performing processes (Pouillaude 2009, 77). He has chosen to redescribe the problem 
of dance’s mode of existence in a conceptual imagery more passionate than the one yielded by the 
terms of positivist logic. Dance exhibits, for lack of an appropriate English translation, 
désoeuvrement: the regime of an ‘unworking’ (idle, inoperative) work. It is characterised, on the one 
hand, by physical expenditure (la dépense) or indifference to the trace or residue of action 
(Pouillaude 2009, 76), and on the other hand, by auto-affection, where motion in performance 
produces an infinite cycle of the renewal of energy in lieu of objects or things (Pouillaude 2009, 81). 
In concert with many recent projects which reinvent the tools for documenting and transmitting 
works of dance,3 we may conclude that the ontological status of each work must be resolved 
individually. This entails paying attention to the idiosyncratic relationship between the shareable 
(exterior or public) and the reticent, self-absorbed or shattered aspects of a dance work, case by 
case.  
3. Meaning and sense  
The third problem concerns the production of meaning in dance, how dance signifies or ‘makes 
sense’, which has been labeled as the ‘standard sotto voce accompaniment’ to much of twentieth-
century and contemporary dance, attesting to the puzzlement of novice dance audiences (Sheets-
Johnstone 1979, 33). From the viewpoint of analytic philosophy, this problem is addressed as a 
matter of underdetermination: 
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… the dance work is always underdetermined, relative to any particular 
performance of it, since each performance makes concrete in particular ways 
features of the dance which might have been concretized in other ways, indeed, 
which might be made concrete in those other ways in another performance of that 
dance, even one by the same company. (McFee 2001, 548) 
One way in which recent dance studies have grappled with bewilderment in the face of what 
appears abstract and elusive about dancing movement was to attribute it to an ontology of 
disappearance. Peggy Phelan’s thesis according to which performance is considered an event of 
elusive presence condemned to loss and repetitions of memory (Phelan 1993, 148–152) has had a 
significant impact on a segment of dance scholarship aligned with Lacanian and Derridean 
discourses on presence, writing, subjectivity, the gaze and history (Kruschkova ed. 2005; Siegmund 
2006; Lepecki 2006; Foellmer 2009). The ephemerality of movement in dance is described as the 
body’s self-erasure in the ‘fading forms’ of movement, and moreover is featured as a paradigm of 
the fundamental condition of performance. Disappearance, loss, lack and absence have been the 
notions through which dance scholars in the past decade have examined movement with bodily 
presence, regarding it as that which disappears and marks the passing of time. Comparison with 
music, as the time-based art with which dance shares some phenomenal characteristics, shows 
how inept the notion of dance existing ‘at a perpetual vanishing point’ is (Siegel 1972, 1). Music is 
no less immaterial than dance, yet thanks to its early alliance with science and philosophy, it has 
developed a notational system that secures against its disappearance. Had dance not been 
disregarded for its too fleshy (and therefore, ironically material) appearance in the past, it wouldn’t 
have been so easily condemned to an ontology disappearance. Thus, the theme of disappearance 
obscures the problem of dance’s significance, which the divergent philosophical theories had tried 
to solve earlier. It might be worthwhile to revisit the most noted attempts in so far as they disclose 
philosophy’s method of making dance its object. We will map them out briefly here. 
Susanne K. Langer was among the first authors who sought to explain how dance signifies, 
specifically on the basis of her symbolisation theory, devised under the influence of Ernst Cassirer 
(Langer 1953). Countering the prevalent notion of self-expression in modern dance, which she, 
unlike many other philosophers, was sufficiently familiar with so as to invoke it in concrete 
examples (Mary Wigman features as a prominent case), Langer introduced a distinction between 
the virtual and actual aspects of gesture as a symbolic form of imagined feelings in lieu of felt or 
intended-to-be-expressed emotions. The founding assumption of her conception of the virtual is 
indebted to Cassirer’s concept of ‘mythical consciousness’, in which the symbol and its meaning 
are inseparable, and which reveals a quest for a deep-seated meaning of dance in tune with the 
German idealist tradition of Ausdruckstanz, as demonstrated by the following excerpt:  
The dance creates an image of nameless and even bodiless Powers filling a 
complete, autonomous realm, a ‘world.’ It is the first presentation of the world as a 
realm of mystic forces…. The substance of such dance creation is the same Power 
that enchanted ancient caves and forests, but today we invoke it with full knowledge 
of its illusory status, and therefore with wholly artistic intent. (Langer 1983, 38; 45) 
 
 
12 PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 1 (2015) 
A similar phenomenological ground with mystical undertones is to be found in Maxine Sheets-
Johnstone’s theory of objects-in-motion. Whereas Langer’s theory accounts for the expressionist 
view of abstract motion, Sheets-Johnstone’s phenomenological analysis of the perception of 
motion gives the basis for a formalist perspective on abstract bodily movement and presence. Or 
in her words, 
the dancer is not moving through a form; a form is moving through him. The dancer 
is not doing movement; movement is doing him. To be an object-in-motion is to 
fulfill a kinetic destiny, and to fulfill a kinetic destiny is to bring a qualitative world to 
life …. The dancer is not making the quality manifest, the quality is manifesting itself. 
… It is only insofar as the dancer is permeated by quality, that he or she allows it full 
play by surrendering to it, that quality appears, and that the dancer can be 
described as ‘having’ a certain quality. It is on the basis of being had and thus having, 
or being possessed and thus possessing, that we can speak of a qualitative 
presence. In effect, quality is everywhere present because it is an absolute 
possession, and it is an absolute possession because it is an absolute surrender. 
(Sheets-Johnstone 1979, 40) 
My aim in citing these two phenomenological interpretations of dance at length is to indicate the 
genealogy of the prevalent vitalist idea which motivates dance practitioners throughout the 
twentieth century and today, be it a mystical power that expresses itself in motion4 or a formal 
quality that, despite its being objectified, possesses the body. This idea is the metaphysical horizon 
by which philosophy ennobled dance and elevated its status to a high art in the period from the 
1950s to the 1970s. And it is also the episteme which Susan Foster breaks with in her quest for a 
dance theory that will specifically read dances and their subjects from a structuralist perspective 
of literary rhetorics and semiotics.  
In retrospect, Foster’s Reading Dancing: Bodies and Subjects in Contemporary American Dance (1986) 
is not only emblematic of the structuralist and, specifically semiotic, encroachment upon dance 
scholarship and its operation against received phenomenological ideas about dance. It also marks 
the beginning of a wholesale translation of methods of culturalist analysis and poststructuralist 
criticism, as well as of a set of particular concerns and topics mirroring the agendas of feminism, 
gender and queer theory, postcolonial theory and the politics of racial, ethnic and other kinds of 
identitarian difference, which shaped Dance Studies in the 1990s (see Goellner and Shea 1994, 
Koritz 1996, Dils and Cooper 2001). Finally, dance theory was no longer short of meaning-
production, but of thought, or the problems and questions which would provoke philosophical 
thinking that would be particular to dance. In too many academic papers the works of dance 
started to model, like mannequins, for a particular theoretical interpretation, which reduced their 
meaning and thought-provoking capacity to readymade terms and concepts (see Desmond 1997). 
Therefore, another turn was needed, this time coming from a number of choreographers in Europe 
who sought a new poetics, one which would upset the sensibility and knowledge about dance and 
exceed both the formalist-abstract paradigm of dance with its phenomenological heritage and the 
poststructuralist readings of dance qua text. It was the choreographers themselves—Jérôme Bel, 
Xavier Le Roy, Vera Mantero, Juan Dominguez, Mårten Spångberg, Eszter Salamon, Mette 
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Ingvartsen, BADco and others across Europe—who shifted their focus from the formal-expressive 
categories of style, language and thematic “aboutness” of an aesthetic object to a critical and 
experimental inquiry into the conditions of theatrical representation, such as the act and the 
subject of performance (Mantero’s Perhaps she could dance first and think afterwards, 1991; Bel’s 
The Last Performance, 1998; Salamon’s What A Body You Have Honey, 2001), spectatorship (Bel’s The 
Show Must Go On, 2001), the creation process, rehearsal and presentation (Le Roy’s 
E.X.T.E.N.S.I.O.N.S., 1998–2003, Dominguez’ All Good Spies Are My Age, 2002), material conditions of 
work (BADco/Nikolina Pristaš’ Changes/Promjene), and so forth. Their preoccupations began to 
centre on what dance or performance is, how choreography could be expanded beyond the 
movement of the body and how the way dance is made necessarily determines performance. As 
the aesthetic values of kinetic forms or expressions became secondary, although not entirely 
absent, their work was labeled as ‘conceptual dance’; however, this term is arguably a misnomer, 
since all the work had in common with conceptual art was the conceptualisation of its working 
methods and medium – namely, the dancing body.5 But the most important outcome of what 
critics also referred to as ‘new choreography’ or ‘new choreographic performance’ (Lepecki 1999, 
2006; Ploebst 2001) was that ‘theory’, or rather the reading of texts by Derrida, Deleuze, Deleuze 
and Guattari and so on, became a resource for choreographic texts, aligning dance with philosophy 
in the very poetics of dance. The effect that such a theoretical or conceptual turn had on 
contemporary dance is that it made it more widely visible, beyond what used to be the narrow and 
marginalized segment of the performing arts—that is to say, dance.6  
Philosophers’ metaphors of dance 
The conceptual turn in contemporary dance and the discussions that included the voices of 
contemporary philosophers precipitated an interest in dance among important figures in 
contemporary European philosophy, such as Jean-Luc Nancy, whose conversations with the 
choreographer Mathilde Monnier spawned a book and a performance (Nancy and Monnier 2005, 
performance Allitérations 2001), or Jacques Rancière, whose essays ‘The Emancipated Spectator’ 
(2009) and ‘The Moment of Dance’ (2014) were written on the occasion of gatherings organised by 
the protagonists of so-called conceptual dance.7 Prior to these, Alain Badiou’s essay ‘Dance as a 
Metaphor for Thought’ ([1993] 2005) elicited attention outside philosophy among dance and 
performance theorists by the force of his contentious assertions about dance.8  
Although Badiou’s and Rancière’s views on dance differ to the extent that their philosophical 
projects are politically and epistemologically different, they share a familiar methodological habit: 
their approach bypasses works of dance by mainly focusing on literary or cinematic sources that 
mediate dance or bodily movement. In both cases, Mallarmé’s writings on dance figure is a 
significant reference (Mallarmé 1956). Whereas Rancière occasionally invokes concrete works 
(Lucinda Childs’ Dance from 1979, for example) because his thesis on the aesthetic regime of art 
must be situated historically with a hint of analytical examples, for Badiou dance doesn’t exist 
empirically, in the history of its practice, works, techniques, names and bodies (the only dance-
related names being Mallarmé and Nietzsche). In fact, Badiou explicitly discloses his ‘mission’ to 
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speak of ‘dance not thought on its own terms, on the basis of its history and technique, but of 
dance such as it is given welcome and shelter by philosophy’ (Badiou 2005, 63; my emphasis). Dance 
appears as nothing more than an instrument of a philosophical exercise—a new ‘metaphor’ for 
probing Badiou’s familiar subtractive ontology of event and thought. Therefore, we are compelled 
to make a binary decision, just like Badiou’s event requires of its subjects: to either read this essay 
figuratively, as a specimen of the philosopher’s conception of art and aesthetics, divorced from any 
historical and practical concerns of the art of dance, or to take Badiou’s metaphor ‘seriously’ and 
envisage the dance that would ensue from his axioms. In a recent critique of Badiou, Jonathan 
Owen Clark has demonstrated how measuring the latter with the former register, namely, Badiou’s 
theory from the viewpoint of the history of dance with his claims of ‘inaesthetics’, reveals difficulties 
in his philosophical arguments (Clark 2011). Let’s briefly examine a few striking points in Badiou’s 
encounter with dance.  
With the aim of ostensibly furthering Nietzsche’s praise of thought against the spirit of gravity, 
epitomized by the obedience of long German legs (i.e. military parade), Badiou rouses a series of 
Nietzsche’s metaphors that depict dancing as flight (‘bird’), explosive leap (‘fountain’), the innocence 
of a new beginning (‘child’), and as illusive lightness (‘intangible air’). The body of his description is 
likened to the silent ballet dancer ‘on points’ that ‘pricks the floor just as one would puncture a 
cloud’ (Badiou 2005, 59). To make the metaphor ‘work’, the philosopher adjusts his image of dance 
to the requirements of his well-known subtractive ontology of event, which I will briefly outline 
here. The dancing body must be unrestrained, its movement not caused externally. Dancing isn’t 
about self-expression either, since it appears as a muted intensity, or in Badiou’s words, ‘interiority’ 
itself. Thus, for Badiou dance solely extends in space—an indeterminate, ‘pure’, virgin site; it 
doesn’t have a name, as its body is anonymous too. It determines the stage before the event 
acquires a name that would cut the past from the future, and is therefore a suspension of time 
within space. Badiou’s vision of dance subtracts all particularity from it, not only a historical context 
in which a particular subject acts and all possible registers of relations resulting from composing 
the motion of bodies in time and space, but also the form and concept in the act of dancing, the 
choreographic knowledge which supports it as well as the gaze which interprets it. The closest 
image of such dance would be the ‘spontaneous’ free improvisation in a solo performance, but 
seen in and for itself, in a romantic guise of an incorporeal event in which dancing marks the limit 
between being and disappearing. The translation of this image into contemporary dance practice 
resonates with the problematic ubiquity of solo dance, which promotes the individual autonomy 
of the dancer and the fetishist exclusivity of a ‘here-and-now’ expression withdrawing from this 
world. Reveling in Mallarmé’s paradoxical statement that ‘the dancer doesn’t dance’, Badiou 
dispossesses dance of the right to be an art, bestowing on it, conversely, a loftier status: the 
vanishing ‘sign’ of the possibility of art as such, inscribed in a ‘thought-body’ (Badiou 2005, 64). A 
condescending gift evocative of the Hegelian evaluative hierarchy of the arts with philosophy’s 
eminence above them: dance isn’t art, because it is much more than art. It is the condition of 
possibility for art as the body’s capacity for thought.   
That Badiou’s philosophical abduction of dance implies a classical conception about modernist 
autonomy can be best inferred from a comparison with Rancière’s ‘Moment of Dance’ (Rancière 
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2014). Like Badiou, Rancière reasserts his established theory on the several regimes of art, the 
aesthetic regime in particular, upon the new terrain of dance (Rancière 2004). However, his reading 
of the same claims that Badiou elaborated with Mallarmé, about the anonymity of the dancing 
woman who is not a woman and who does not dance, yields, in Rancière, a different concept of 
autonomy. Aptly, the centerpiece of his analysis is movement in Dziga Vertov’s film Man with a 
Movie Camera (1929), the notable documentary which experiments with cinematic techniques in 
representing Soviet urban life. When Rancière designates this movement as ‘free’, which peculiarly 
echoes the French term for early modern dance after Isadora Duncan (‘danse libre’), he 
painstakingly distinguishes it from the spontaneous, free expression based on will. In an implicit 
commentary on Badiou’s essentialist view on dance, Rancière explains that free movement is not 
a matter of a purified essence specific to dance, but of an indistinction between means and ends, 
an aesthetic revolution in the Kantian sense of beauty and a “human revolution” as in Marx’s sense 
of ending the alienation of workers. Thus he wrests the autonomy of movement from the cross-
cutting of the images of people at work and people at play in Vertov’s film as a case of heteronomy, 
a heterogeneous equality: 
The movements of the dancers are carried along in the rhythm of the montage. 
But, conversely, dance is the art that epitomizes the work of montage…. [It] is not 
so much the model of an original spring of the body as it is a model of translation, 
in the two senses of the word: it is a movement that presents itself as the 
translation of another movement. This is what was meant by Mallarmé’s formula: 
the dancer does not dance. Instead she writes. However what she writes is not a 
composition of the movements and figures belonging to the vocabulary of the 
ballet. It is, he says, a ‘metaphor of our form’. But this metaphor has no translation 
in any dictionary of tropes. It is the task of the spectator to translate it in turn, to 
compose for himself the poem that the ballerina writes with her feet. (Rancière 
2014, n.p.) 
In contrast with Badiou’s ontological grip on dance as a new beginning, Rancière adamantly vies 
for an iterative differentiation that renders translation political. In a word, what operates in 
translation is the principle of equality which emancipates both dance and its spectators from the 
hierarchy of prescribed roles, activities and places, or of the police as a general law of distributing 
the sensible.  
Apart from undoing the simple antinomy of the subtractive essentialist claim of modernist 
autonomy in Badiou—by showing that the more one stresses the specificity of an art, the more 
one is compelled to identify that specificity with the experience of radical heterogeneity (Clark 
2011, n.p.)—what does Rancière’s aesthetic regime do for dance? It provides the philosophical 
ground for a broader transdisciplinary consideration of dance as an instrument for studying the 
social practices of movement and bodies outside/beyond the narrow bounds of a specific art 
discipline. By consequence, the concept of ‘social choreography’ attests to such an approach, 
endorsing the critical analysis of how ideology operates aesthetically and how dance and everyday 
movement rehearse rather than only reflect social order (Hewitt 2005, Cvejić and Vujanović 2012). 
In Rancière’s notion of dance as ‘montage’ as well as in the study of ‘social choreography’, we can 
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observe how the instrumentalisation of dance exceeds its usurpation by philosophy by conversely 
bracing dance and choreography as the instrument (and not as a metaphor) of expanded thought.  
Choreographic performance practice and the expression of thought  
There is yet one more register of the encounter between dance and philosophy, one which perhaps 
comes the closest to ‘performance philosophy’ as its particular ‘dance-variant’. It concerns a kind 
of thought that arises from the recent practice of European contemporary choreography (since the 
mid-1990s) and at the same time gives rise to, that is, distinguishes, the specific modes of making, 
performing and spectatorship in dance. What qualifies such movement is immanence, as Laura 
Cull describes it (Cull 2013, 12-13): a vertigo that ceaselessly produces processes that interfere in 
one another, processes of thought, sensibility, imagination, physical movement, attention and so 
on, as opposed to the hierarchy of philosophical thought transcending dance. Thus, the 
choreographic practice in question develops a distinctive method of creation which could be 
accounted for as choreographing problems, rooted in the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze and his 
reading of Spinoza and Henri Bergson.9 The choreographic creation of problems as an expressive 
logic of thought will be featured here as a specimen of the theorisation of choreography in the 
nexus of philosophy and experimental dance practice. A comparable approach is found in Petra 
Sabisch’s study titled Choreographing Relations: Practical Philosophy And Contemporary Choreography 
(2011), whose explicit aim is to situate philosophy and choreography on a par with, and on the 
same plane as, an immanent practice of thought. While Sabisch emphasises thought and sensibility 
as concepts of relation — as singular ‘assemblages of relations to objects, to music, to bodies, 
relations between bodies, relations of visibility, relations between forces, relations of movement 
and rest, etc.’ (Sabisch 2011, 7) — here problem will be the term in my account of the relation 
between ideas and experimentation. Whereas relationality stresses the proximity between 
philosophical and choreographic articulation, ‘problem’ focalises the driving force of critical and 
experimental modes of creation.  
The choreographers whose work is comprehended by the method of problems belong to that 
grouping of artists from various disciplines who have developed an affinity with Deleuze’s thought 
over the last two decades.10 However, the references to Deleuze in their work are occasional and 
inconsistent, often mixed with a whole array of other philosophers and theories. Thus, the fact that 
these choreographers have been reading contemporary philosophy, Deleuze among other 
authors, does not legitimize per se or determine the ways that Deleuzian thought might matter for 
contemporary choreography. It informs us, though, as Efrosini Protopapa has remarked about 
Jonathan Burrows and Xavier Le Roy, that ‘these artists consider writing, reading and discussing a 
method of practice within choreography’ (Protopapa 2004, n.p.), which compels us to read them with 
a particular focus on the questions that guided them in experimenting. 
In a brief definition, the method of problems consists in the posing of questions that differentiate 
terms and conditions under which the creation of a material object—the composition of a bodily 
movement—unfolds. In Deleuze, problems are objects of ‘Ideas’, as they characterise the 
relationship between forms of thought and forms of sensibility as one of difference rather than 
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identity. Ideas here are choreographic, which entails inventions of the body and/or movement in 
performance as well as of time that is coextensive with the body and movement in performance. 
In European contemporary dance, the choreographic idea that constituted modern dance during 
the first decades of the twentieth century is still pivotal: the synthesis between the body and 
movement under two operations, the subjectivation of the dancer through (emotive) self-
expression and the objectivation of movement through the physical expression of the dancing 
body. Subjectivation secures the necessity of the movement in the body’s urge to move and 
express its inner (emotional) experience. Objectivation presupposes another relationship between 
movement, the body and the subject in the expressive act: dancing is foregrounded, or even 
reduced to a physical articulation of the movement, whose meaning lies, tautologically, in itself. 
Movement is created as an object in itself that engages bones, muscles, ligaments, nerves and 
other body parts of the dancer in strictly physical activity. Objectivation of the movement by self-
referentiality renounces the expression of the self in the movement—the ‘outwarding’ of an inner 
experience—but it still relies on the body-movement bind.  
Both types of synthesis connect the body and movement in one organic whole, which in the 
experimental practice of European contemporary dance is rendered problematic. The rupture of 
the organic regime consists of dispensing either with the body as the source of authentic 
movement or with the object of movement to which the body is physically tied. Choreographing 
problems involves composing these ruptures between movement, the body and time in 
performance such that they engender a shock upon sensibility, one that renders many aspects of 
choreographic performances hard to identify, recognize or accommodate within the horizon of 
expectations of contemporary dance. These problems ‘force’ thought as an exercise of the limits 
of sensibility that can be accounted for not by representation, but by the principle of expression 
that Deleuze develops from Spinoza’s philosophy in his key books on ontology, Expressionism in 
Philosophy: Spinoza ([1968] 1992) and Difference and Repetition ([1968] 1994). Expression is a logic 
opposed to representation; it is a certain way of thinking and forming ideas outside of analogy and 
emanation as the dual aspects that govern (transcendental) relations of agreement between the 
idea and the object understood to be a thing. It is the thought that forces a practical path in which 
ideas in the form of problems and compositions arise in parallel, non-causal correspondence. The 
probing of this path could be referred to as experimentation, whereby time is inserted into the 
construction of the problem, doubled by a sensorial and affective experience of the experiment 
parallel to the thought. This time could be regarded as a time of learning, which involves unlearning 
or undoing, ungrounding the knowledge of possibilities that reproduce rather than create new 
movements, bodies and their relations. Such learning implies ‘violent’ training without a general 
method, but with a dedication to the problem that, as Deleuze describes, ‘demand[s] the very 
transformation of our body and our language’ (Deleuze 1994, 192). Le Roy explicitly refers to 
learning as the process of a removal of habit under the construction of constraints: 
I always worked with constructing constraints in order to produce ‘new’ movement 
or to transform the perception of the body in a situation. What can you do when 
you cannot do this or that; you have to look for another way, and you have to go 
around habits. In a way, it’s making things difficult in order to explore ways outside 
the power of habits. (Le Roy in Cvejić 2009, n.p.).  
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Problems, also understood as the disruptions of habits, as Le Roy reports above, offer us an insight 
into a coextensive parallelism between thinking and the practices of making, performing and 
attending choreographic performance. Thus, the parallelism accounts for their dual status: the 
problems stem from the very process of creation, as they express the thought that guides the 
choreographers in their decisions; and the problems are also given by the performances, as they 
further provoke us, who observe the work post hoc, to account for them conceptually by a 
philosophical method. In this way, choreography contributes to a philosophical rethinking of the 
relationship between the body, movement and time and, consequently, gives rise to distinctive 
concepts of its own.11  
The theory of expression of thought we have outlined here shares a common ground with a few 
other philosophical accounts of contemporary dance that separate these Deleuzian approaches 
from the previously discussed philosophies of dance.12 Its main assumption is that dance, like any 
other performance, should be regarded as a time-based art, in contrast to the linguistic 
assumptions of performativity. The approach of the expression-based thought in choreography 
favors the notion of attending, according to which performance is approached from the aspect of 
time conceived as Bergsonian duration: a ‘succession of qualitative changes, which melt into and 
permeate one another’ (Bergson 2002, 61), an indivisible continuous multiplicity. The experimental 
choreographic practice of the last two decades has countered the perception of movement’s 
ephemerality or bodily presence/absence by sustaining motion and stillness, by persisting in the 
transformation of movement and bodies into the future, by exploring sensations and affects in 
processes of becoming, by implicating the spectators in processes beyond the actual performance, 
by manipulating performers’ memory of past movements in the present. These strategies all point 
to the importance of duration, or time in which change is created and perceived, and becoming, 
through which the bodies and movements transform. Therefore, dance is better approached as a 
transformation process rather than as a fleeting act—contrary to the prevalent thesis about 
dance’s disappearance, which we discussed earlier in Badiou’s and other philosophical accounts of 
dance. The genesis of dance is located in process and duration rather than in an act whose 
meaning transcends or lies outside of duration. 
Prospects of a dance-philosophy 
We are coming to the end of a winding course marked by historical, inherited difficulties, and then 
by the sporadic ventures of philosophy into dance in the twentieth century. Having arrived at the 
beginnings of a ‘dance-philosophy’ today as a kind of thought which arises within the material 
practice of dancing, only provisory conclusions can be drawn. First of all, thanks to the expansion 
of choreographic poetics during the last two decades, and to its encounter with Deleuze, dance 
has ceased to figure as a metaphor in universal abstract singular form, an ahistorical conduit for a 
general ontology, as it was for Nietzsche or Badiou. What contemporary dance and its theories 
have ‘learnt’ from Deleuze is the immanence of the practice, whereby philosophy no longer claims 
the exclusive right to thinking nor does it seek dance to flesh out its abstract and general ideas. 
Secondly, after centuries of musing on ‘what philosophy could do for dance’, the question is now 
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reversed. Recent writings by Brian Massumi and Erin Manning, as well as Alva Noë, contribute with 
advanced solutions to the problem of ‘what dance can do for philosophy’ instead. In view of 
opening philosophy to its outside, Massumi and Manning explore ‘what writing can do to make 
thought-felt what art can do, with philosophy’ (Massumi and Manning 2012, vii) after Deleuze, 
expanded in relation to A. N. Whitehead’s process oriented philosophy and William James’s radical 
empiricism (see also Manning 2013). Like Massumi and Manning, Noë has also incorporated his 
research of William Forsythe’s movement language into his study of the embodied action-based 
cognition (Noë 2012). Dance in particular has enabled him to demonstrate how perception and 
concept-formation can no longer be accounted for by the traditional representational theory of 
mind, how they instead depend on skills acquired through doing and training, similarly to how 
dance is learnt and made. The effect of dance entering these philosophical considerations is an 
upgrading of a speculative philosophy of process, for instance, or of a phenomenology combined 
with cognitive science that takes an experimental, radically pragmatic stance. Given the newly 
gained experimental ground of philosophies which consider dance as a movement of thought, we 
might hope that some problems that contemporary dance has been grappling with—kinaesthesia 
and proprioception as sensations specifically related to bodily movement, and gesture—will 
become the object of a fruitful, reciprocal encounter between contemporary dance and 
contemporary philosophy, or, in a (portmanteau experimental composition of a) word, a dance-
philosophy.  
 
1 The duality in the ontological status of the work which involves performance, such as music and dance, was first 
posited by phenomenological aesthetics, most notably in the work of the Polish philosopher Roman Ingarden 
(1989). 
2 Myriam Imschoot (200) writes: “When looking for an overview on the notational endeavors of choreographers 
and dance makers in the last centuries, what one sees is more a sort of ‘babelisation’ of idiosyncratic instructions 
than a commonly and widely applied overarching language. To some, the dream of making dance visible and thus 
indelible has therefore proven to be an illusion. Unable to furnish the bones, dance would linger outside, on the 
threshold of the archive.” 
3 William Forsythe, Improvisation Technologies, CD ROM 1999; Emio GrecoPC Inside Movement Knowledge, 2008; 
Forsythe’s Motion Bank with online scores of the works by Jonathan Burrows and Matteo Fargion, Deborah Hay, 
Bebe Miller and Thomas Hauert available online (http://motionbank.org). 
4 For a contemporary dance poetics rooted in formalism and combined with Far-Eastern philosophical influences 
that imbue the form with mystical value, see the work of Anne Teresa De Keersmaeker (De Keersmaeker and Cvejić 
2013). 
5 The debate about ‘conceptual dance’ went on for a few years in European journals and magazines specialised in 
the performing arts (Frakcija, Maska, TkH Journal for Performing Arts Theory, Ballet-Tanz International, Mouvement, 
Etcetera and others) and came to the conclusion that ‘conceptual dance’ does not designate any movement, 
poetics, style or genre. Instead, it symptomatically evidences a problem of qualifying as choreographies those 
performances that contest the foundational characteristics of dance as a historical art discipline. ‘Conceptual 
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6  The following exhibitions and programs are just a few among many that testify to a keen interest in 
choreographic performance in the contemporary visual arts context: the exhibition Move: Choreographing You at 
Hayward Gallery, London, autumn 2010; Choreography: Experiencing Space, Time and Ideas, a workshop at Tate 
Modern in autumn, 2011; The Performance Exhibition Series, which primarily features dance, in MOMA, New York, 
since January 2009; and the opening at Tate Modern of The Tanks, a permanent venue for performance and other 
time-based arts.  
7 In the opening of his book titled The Emancipated Spectator (2009), Rancière explains how this volume of essays 
originates in an invitation to reflect on the spectator on the basis of ideas developed in his book The Ignorant 
Schoolmaster at the opening lecture of the fifth Internationale Sommerakademie in Frankfurt am Main in 2004. 
8  For a critique of Badiou’s reflections on dance in relation to the subjectivity instilled by solo dance, see Kunst 
(2003). Jonathan Owen Clark (2011) has written a critical exegesis of the same essay by Badiou, probing the terms 
of Badiou’s general subtractive ontology of Merce Cunningham’s concept, language and oeuvre, taken as a 
counterpart to Badiou’s favorite case in point, Arnold Schönberg. 
9  The following section is derived from my upcoming book Choreographing Problems: Expressive Concepts in 
European Contemporary Dance and Performance (forthcoming). 
10 Hence, ‘body without organs’, ‘becoming’, ‘rhizome’ and ‘affect’ feature as prominent terms in the lingo of dance 
practitioners.  
11 In Choreographing Problems I devise several concepts on the basis of a philosophical consideration of seven 
works: Self Unfinished (1998) and Untitled (2005) by Xavier Le Roy, Weak Dance Strong Questions (2001) by Jonathan 
Burrows and Jan Ritsema, héâtre-élévision (2002) by Boris Charmatz, Nvsbl (2006) by Eszter Salamon, 50/50 (2005) 
by Mette Ingvartsen, and It’s In The Air (2007) by Ingvartsen and Jefta van Dinther. ‘Part-bodies’, ‘part-machines’, 
‘movement-sensations’, ‘headbox’, ‘wired assemblings’, ‘stutterances’, ‘power-motion’, ‘crisis-motion’, ‘cut-ending’ 
and ‘resonance’ account for the construction of problems and compositions that desubjectivise or disobjectivise 
relations between movement, body and time as regards the constitution of the dancing body, and between 
performing and attending (to) performance with respect to theater dance. 
12 See also Lepecki (2006) and Apostolou-Hölscher (forthcoming). 
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